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Iran War: The view from Beijing The two aircraft carriers Washington sent for operations against Iran did not play a role in the Persian Gulf, and neither did their taskforce. The USS Abraham Lincoln withdrew into the Indian Ocean and its taskforce stayed off Oman. The USS Gerald R. Ford was stationed off Israel until a fire forced it to sail for Virginia. The lesson for Beijing is that the US dare not send its naval ships, particularly its aircraft carriers, into narrow waters where they could be targeted by hypersonic and ballistic missiles, shore to ship missiles, underwater Cruise missiles, drones, mines and mini submarines. China is, of course, better armed than Iran and has far more sophisticated radar and tracking systems that would give them time to track and, prepare for, an American naval offensive. The Iran war must have prompted Chinese strategists to draw the conclusion that even though the Taiwan Strait is wider than the Straits of Hormuz, the US would hesitate before allowing ships to enter it. China does not need to prepare for a re-run of the 1942 Battle of Midway where Japan confronted the US Navy, both deploying aircraft carriers and capital ships. It could rely on missiles and other land based weapons that are dug in and defendable, as is the case in Iran. China and Iran are trading allies, and they must have shared information about how to prepare for this kind of war. But it is quite possible that neither Tehran nor Beijing foresaw the recklessness of Trump’s leadership, to say nothing of the way in which Netanyahu has manipulated him. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy prioritises the Western Hemisphere where ‘non-Hemispheric competitors’, like China, need to be pushed out. This was the intention when Trump attacked Venezuela and kidnapped President Maduro. US imperial policy in the Far East was to be maintained as the prime economic and military focus of the administration, shifting away from Europe and the Middle East. Yet, Trump allowed himself to go to war on Iran having been assured by Netanyahu, based on intelligence supplied by Mossad, that a war would be short and sharp, ending in the regime’s removal. Instead, he is now in the fourth week of what is at best a stalemate, and at worst for Washington, Iran having the advantage. China must be delighted. Seeing America taking missile defences from South Korea to send to the Gulf highlights the limits of US power and its ability to operate at full strength in more than one theatre. Even if Trump can secure a peace deal with Iran, he will have to make concessions that will damage his prestige even further. And then there is the question of Cuba and his growing unpopularity as the US moves towards the mid-term elections. Confidence in Beijing must be rising. A US-China war would make Iran look like a tea party and there is little chance that any US administration, let alone Trump, could take the American public with them against China. America is supposed to have the best intelligence in the world. That includes not just the CIA but other bodies such as the National Security Council (NSC). Based in the White House, the NSC provides national security and foreign policy advice to the president. But under Trump the NSC has been hollowed out. One hundred and sixty staff members were told in January, to work from home while the administration reviews staffing and tries to align it with Trump’s agenda. National Security Adviser, Mike Walz, was also fired. As a PBS report says of sacking the NSC staff: ‘Trump, a Republican, is sidelining these nonpolitical subject matter experts on topics that range from counterterrorism to global climate policy at a time when the U.S. is grappling with a disparate set of complicated foreign policy matters, including conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Such structuring could also make new policy experts brought in to the NSC less likely to speak up about policy differences and concerns’. Last week CNN reported that the NSC and Pentagon had drastically underestimated Iran’s ability to close the Straits of Hormuz. The report states: ‘Trump’s preference of leaning on a tight circle of close advisers in his national security decision making had the effect of sidelining interagency debate over the potential economic fallout if Iran were to respond to US-Israeli strikes by closing the Straits [of Hormuz]’. Then in stepped Mossad who had already assured Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, they could easily engineer the collapse of the regime by initiating mass protests. This was music to Trump’s ears. Unfortunately for both him and Netanyahu it was wrong. Trump’s social media boasting and threats, including to NATO allies, did not go down well at home or abroad. General Ben Hodges, who commanded U.S. troops in Europe during President Barack Obama’s second term, spoke out about Trump’s cavalier disregard for US allies saying: ‘It just seems detached from reality. Our allies look at this and they wonder, what the hell is going on. It doesn’t look like we’re serious’. Trump’s seeming inability to work with allies will have been noted in Beijing too. Any operation against China would have to involve Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia. For that coalition to be called together and hold together in war, it would need the leadership of someone vastly superior to Trump. China will act in its own interests and has no intention of fighting for anything else. China is an imperialist power too, and has grown to rival US economic power by avoiding direct confrontation with America. In Iran that meant not getting involved in war and not antagonizing Washington. President Xi is still set to meet Trump in five or six weeks’ time, and has a much stronger hand to play after four weeks of the US-Iran war, concerning trade and sanctions. Iran will need massive help in rebuilding its infrastructure when the war ends. If China steps up to that plate it will be gifted a much greater influence over future Iranian policy. The Gulf States will reassess the protection the US has given them, and China will see diplomatic and economic chances there too. Across the Global South Trump has further alienated governments such as South Africa and Brazil, already angry with Washington over Gaza and Venezuela, and who may well now look to deepen relations with China. Within China’s strategic community, analysts ‘increasingly view the war [in Iran] as exposing the limits of American power, accelerating global fragmentation, and opening space for China’s gradual influence expansion’. That’s right, and it means in a world increasingly divided between the two great powers, the weaker militarily power has gained an advantage. https://www.counterfire.org/article/the-view-from-beijing-iran-war-briefing/ Back |
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