 |
|  |
|
Strait of Hormuz: A Test for the Islamic Republic in the Era of "Mohammad Samting" and Mojtaba The story of Muhammad and the excavator, however, is not the main story of the current tension. The main story is unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz, and the current crisis is a complete confusion for both sides. The reason why Iran’s opponents do not know how Tehran’s steps are chosen and taken is partly clear. Outsiders have been confronted with Iran’s asymmetric security model for decades, and due to this “analytical habit” they consider the current ambiguity to be a new version of Tehran’s previous strategy. But that's not all. The issue today is not just strategic ambiguity. The ambiguity lies in the decision-making mechanism itself. It is still unclear how the nervous system of governance in Iran after Ali Khamenei gives orders and moves the body. As long as Ali Khamenei was alive, the final decision-making authority in Tehran's confrontation with such crises was completely clear. That is, even if voices were heard opposing the diplomatic processes of negotiation and agreement, everyone knew that the leader of this orchestra with all its tuned and untuned instruments was only one person. But what now? Is Mojtabaei really at work? If so, does he really hold power like his father? Does he have a partner? If so, what are the implications of their partnership and who "has a managerial stake"? For this reason, the new episode of the Iran-US conflict can be seen as something completely different from the previous ones. The issue is not just the attacks on ships, the US response, the rise in oil prices or the anxiety of the markets. The issue is whether Tehran can show the world its “single will” at a moment when the world is watching. Why is such an image important? Regardless of how well each side is fulfilling its obligations in the current situation, if diplomacy is to ultimately break the chain of war, it must be shown that the signing of a treaty represents the main lines of power. Both in Iran and in the US. Iran says the current tension is the product of American coercion. America says the same about Iran. This situation is in complete contrast to the horizon outlined in the memorandum. The horizon of the Islamabad memorandum is something like Iran's security coexistence with the United States and Israel. A goal that seemed impossible to even put on paper before the current war, but now the two presidents have signed it. A signature that seems to have meant nothing more to either side than: to cross something out and see what happens next. For Islamabad’s understanding to lead to an agreement between Tehran and Washington, more important than the lines on paper is a coordinated understanding of each side’s understanding of each other. For example, the United States must have reached a point where it sees Iran as an “indigestible enemy” and a usable player in a larger balance. This is a groundbreaking view, because it moves Washington beyond the decades-old dichotomy of “regime change or complete surrender” and opens up the possibility of bargaining, prioritization, and realism. Does Trump see Iran this way? No. Not yet. There is another side to this story. How does Tehran assess Washington’s will and its decision? Does Iran think America is past the point of overthrowing the regime? Not yet. If such a picture of Washington existed in Tehran, the Islamic Republic would have to stage a show of “a government with calculable behavior,” which it did not win. If we were on the path to building a great understanding, Washington and Tehran would have to know who they were talking to and that the signature on the other side represents the behavior and main goals of the power. There are two major and key ambiguities. If in the current situation it is not clear what Trump's "wish" and ultimate plan for the current conflict are, then it is also not clear on the Iranian side who is in charge. The vexing question about Iran is where is the decision-making center? And if such a center exists, does it have the power to implement its decisions? Succession after Ali Khamenei was not an easy task without war and security crisis. Now that all the calamities have befallen the Islamic Republic at once, establishing a successor has become even more difficult. The succession project in the Islamic Republic must be able to find a credible answer to the three issues of legitimacy, command, and the distribution of rent. The new leader, even if he is institutionally in the seat of power, needs the loyalty of the IRGC, the security apparatus, the network of government clergy, the economic bureaucracy, and the official media to establish himself. In such a situation, any diplomatic concession can be interpreted internally as a "show of weakness and humiliation," and any external tension can be a means of demonstrating strength and authority. The new leader must both show that he can contain the crisis and not be accused of starting his work with fear and retreat. This is a dangerous situation that could even make the cost of peace for the power structure heavier than the cost of war. We see the manifestation of this dangerous situation these days in the official image that the "regime" projects of itself. What image? That it has America's throat in its hands and that if "Abu Musa and the Ash'aris" are strangled, it will end the matter forever. The turning point of the crisis is in this picture. For Tehran, the Strait of Hormuz is not just a bargaining chip for gaining concessions, but also the stage for determining the final decision-making right in Iran. Every missile, drone, and speedboat, every military warning, and every diplomatic message Tehran sends is not addressed only to America. Some of these messages are for domestic consumption. They are like a death knell, and are intended to make the various and colorful authorities of power within Iran understand who can still create a crisis, contain a crisis, or raise the cost of peace. In this indoctrination, the IRGC is not a marginal player and is itself one of the centers of decision and implementation. The IRGC is not just a military force of the third leader, but a military, security, economic, media, and ideological apparatus that both pays for and creates opportunities. The IRGC sees the Strait of Hormuz as an important card in the game. A card to paint the picture that “regional arrangements” are not possible without Iran’s consent, and Iran’s consent is not worth a penny without the IRGC’s consent. If the government of doctors or diplomats talk about "understanding," "mediation," and "de-escalation," the IRGC can rewrite the meaning of that understanding with the language of "control," "deterrence," and "transit costs." For this reason, Washington may consider a text to be an agreement, while a section of power in Tehran may interpret the same text as permission for further pressure. The Western narrative of the Islamic Republic usually explains this divide with terms like extremists, rogue factions, or internal strife. These terms are not useless, but they generally minimize the issue. The issue is not necessarily that a rogue group is standing up to the official government. In the Islamic Republic, “sovereignty” is part of the “method of governance.” If we understand arbitrariness as the existence of a power with an unclear source and authority, the existence of these “arbitrary arbitrarinesses” is always political capital for the head of power in the Islamic Republic. When it is not clear where exactly the final decision was made, the government can both benefit from field pressure, not block the path to diplomacy, and, if necessary, say that the action taken was a misunderstanding, a local reaction, or a response to foreign provocation. Ambiguity is both a shield from responsibility and a bargaining tool. But not always. For the US, uncertainty about the Strait of Hormuz is costly. Freedom of navigation, oil prices, financial markets, ship insurance, and the security of Persian Gulf bases will not be soothed by half-hearted assurances. Washington wants a quick, sure guarantee that it can show the market, its Arab allies, Israel, and Congress and say: Look, the crisis is contained. Tehran, however, is avoiding precisely this clarity. The clarity of commitment limits the freedom of action of the field forces and makes the newly installed leader vulnerable to rivals and power partners. The two sides of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding have fundamentally different understandings of the situation they find themselves in. The two sides also want opposite things from the negotiations. America has struck its blows and wants certainty for now, while Iran has suffered many blows and wants ambiguity that can be used to strike back and gain the upper hand. Yesterday's ideological enemies can become today's balancing partners, of course, if there is a greater priority at stake and a positive equation acceptable to both sides is available. Trump's America has not yet succumbed to such an equation, and Iran has not abandoned its usual negative game, presenting itself as a node in global energy; an actor whose power lies in creating disruption. The fate of Iran and what happened to Khamenei should have proven that the “logic of disruption,” while it provides leverage in the short term, can backfire in the long term. If Iran plays too hard with the Strait of Hormuz card, the threat of passage, and global energy insecurity, even the few people in the West who think of a “grand bargain” will be left empty-handed in defending it. No president in America can easily claim to have reached an agreement with a country that has squeezed and held Washington’s throat. The situation is the same in Tehran. The new leader of the Islamic Republic does not want the beginning of his rule to be associated with the image of retreating in the face of bombing and economic pressure. The result is that a psychological and institutional deadlock has been created, in which both sides are in dire need of negotiation and agreement, and are in dire need of "bullying." The big question in Iran today is who can pay for peace? War, with all its devastation, has a more familiar language in highly security-conscious structures. It can be translated into resistance, revenge, deterrence, national zeal, and independence. But peace is difficult to explain. Why were concessions made? What was taken? Who guarantees that America will not renege on its commitments again? And if the IRGC or opposition groups find the agreement inadequate, what institution will restrain them? Two simplifications must be avoided. First, the Islamic Republic should not be seen as a monolithic entity whose every move is directed from a single room. Second, it should not be seen as a completely chaotic entity devoid of any rationality. The reality is probably somewhere in between; a polycentric structure in which institutions compete for survival, status, resources, and narrative, but know that complete collapse would be costly and disastrous for all. The Islamic Republic of 1405 is neither completely predictable like a classical state nor completely powerless like a failed state. It can negotiate, threaten, deny, make concessions, and at the same time deny its responsibility by saying "on principles." In such a system, sometimes the very ambiguity that appears to be weakness from the outside becomes a means of survival from the inside. From this perspective, the new episode of the Strait of Hormuz crisis is a window into Iran's domestic politics at a critical moment of succession. The third leader must be able to follow in his father's footsteps and, while keeping the invisible thread of "arbitraries" at bay, unite the IRGC, the government, and the diplomatic apparatus behind a single line. If he cannot do so, crises will knock on the door. The current crisis and its consequences will ultimately show how capable the Islamic Republic is of producing a unified decision after Ali Khamenei. The Strait of Hormuz is not just a test of the IRGC’s missile and naval power or a tool for pressure against the United States, but ultimately a test of the Third Islamic Republic. Who makes the decisions in Tehran, who can give guarantees and make deals, who can enforce those guarantees, and who can resist the temptation to break them. https://www.radiozamaneh.com/894641 Back |
|
||||||
Thanks for visting the G20 From Below Website. If you want something published here or other enquiries mailto:Brics-from-below@protonmail.com
|
|||||||
