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The crisis of French capitalism and the 2027 presidential election In various articles and documents, we have analyzed the continuous decline of French imperialism over several decades. It is not necessary to go into detail here. This decline has accelerated sharply in recent years. This is particularly evident in Africa, where the French bourgeoisie has suffered a series of humiliating setbacks – to the benefit of other imperialist powers, including China and Russia. But France's decline is far from being confined to Africa. French capitalism is losing ground in global, European, and even domestic markets . Take the example of the pharmaceutical industry, which has historically been a strong point of the French economy. In this sector, imports (into France) from China have reached an unprecedented level: they have increased from €1 billion in 2024 to €2.3 billion in 2025. France's share of total exports within the EU has been declining for 25 years, falling from 18% in 2000 to 13% in 2024. France is suffering from German competition, but not only that. For example, in the European agricultural market, Poland is exporting more and more. It produces nearly a third of the EU's poultry: its production has quadrupled in 25 years, while France's has fallen by 30% over the same period. What is striking in this example is the lack of competitiveness of French capitalism, not only compared to Chinese capitalism, but also to third-tier economies like Poland. And this is just one example among many: the decline of French capitalism is widespread . That said, this is not a linear process – even in Africa. For example, the 2021 coup in Guinea brought to power a former non-commissioned officer in the French Foreign Legion (married to a French gendarme). Since he came to power, Guinea's cooperation with France has intensified – running counter to regional trends – particularly regarding the repression of opponents. In Syria, the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa has signed contracts with several French companies and demonstratively receives diplomatic support from Paris. But this does not change the overall trajectory of French imperialism. In the struggle for markets, spheres of influence, and sources of raw materials, France is now a third-tier power. On the world stage, it is condemned to suffer the consequences of decisions made without its input in Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Berlin. France is a declining power within a declining continent. Europe is no longer a major player. Economically, it can no longer compete with China and the United States. Since 2002, the EU's annual growth has averaged 1.4%, compared to 2% in the United States and 8.3% in China (which is now slowing considerably, but still outperforms the EU in many economic sectors). In September 2024, former ECB President Mario Draghi published a damning report on the investment, productivity, and competitiveness deficits of European capitalism. As the report emphasizes, Europe is hampered by its internal divisions and the small size of its constituent nation-states. This aligns with what we have consistently explained: on the basis of capitalism, genuine economic unification of the European continent is impossible. Rivalries between the various national bourgeoisies stand in its way. During the period of relative economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s, fueled by a significant expansion of global trade, major European capitalists viewed China as a source of highly profitable investments. As for economic relations between Europe and the United States, they benefited both—if not entirely balanced—against a backdrop of overall growth. At the time, a tariff policy like Donald Trump's was unthinkable. In such a context, internal rivalries within the EU took a back seat. The situation has changed since the global financial crisis of 2008. All sorts of conflicts have shaken the EU, particularly regarding migration, budgetary, and monetary issues. Donald Trump's second term marks a qualitative leap in this process. Faced with the aggressiveness of the American president and his trade and military policies, centrifugal tendencies are intensifying within the EU. The pundits on television are calling for a united "awakening" of the EU. Mario Draghi is essentially saying the same thing. But it's a lost cause. Far from fostering greater cooperation on economic and military policies, the enormous combined pressure from the United States, China, and Russia is exacerbating internal divisions within the EU. Everyone is trying to gain an advantage at the expense of their neighbors. The old Franco-German partnership is going its separate ways. Italy and Spain are forging their own paths. And so on. At the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz responded to Macron's calls for "unity" in these terms: "The reorganization of the world by the great powers is taking place faster and more profoundly than we can strengthen ourselves. That is why I am not convinced by the overly instinctive calls for Europe to abandon the United States as a partner. I understand the unease and doubts expressed in such demands. (...) They obscure the harsh geopolitical realities in Europe. And they underestimate the potential that our partnership with the United States continues to have, despite all the difficulties." In short, Merz emphasizes that German capitalism will defend its own interests as it sees fit in the face of pressure and demands from Donald Trump. When he speaks of the "potential of our partnership with the United States ," he is primarily thinking of major German capitalists. Similar divergences are growing between France and Germany regarding the policy to adopt in the face of Chinese economic pressures. Generally speaking, the French bourgeoisie insists on the need to pool the massive investments required to increase European competitiveness—but first and foremost, of course, the competitiveness and market share of French capitalism (particularly in the military sector). In other words, France is proposing that Germany finance, once again, the defense of French economic interests. The German bourgeoisie is all the less inclined to do so given its own internal problems—economic and political (pressures from the AfD)—especially since the start of the war in Ukraine, which has deprived German industry of cheap Russian gas. The German economy is even more exposed than the French economy to Chinese competition and American trade barriers. But in terms of competitiveness, its industry still clearly surpasses that of France. Furthermore, Germany has considerable leeway in terms of public investment in its industry, as its public debt (64% of GDP) is significantly lower than that of France (117% of GDP). Ultimately, in its economic and budgetary choices, the German bourgeoisie is increasingly less inclined to consider the interests of France and other European powers. The same logic applies to the military sphere. In this area, Europe is utterly no match for Russia. In fact, "European defense" is wishful thinking and an outdated fiction. And for good reason: Germany, France, Spain, and Italy, to name just these four countries, do not share the same interests, positions, alliances, or spheres of influence on the world stage. Their foreign policies do not always align. The absence of a common military policy in Europe is not a new phenomenon. For decades, European capitalists were all the less concerned about it as the United States guaranteed the continent's security. But the abrupt shift initiated by Donald Trump in this area has very serious implications from the perspective of European bourgeoisies, particularly in the context of the overwhelming superiority of the Russian army over all the armies on the continent. Here again, the well-meaning souls at LCI are calling for a European "surge" in defense matters. But that is not at all what is happening. For example, a Franco-German fighter jet project (the SCAF), launched in 2017, has been stalled for several months. In mid-February, Macron declared: "If, by chance, the German partner were to call into question the joint aircraft project, we would be forced to call into question the joint tank project . " To which a German minister retorted: "France needs new tanks far more than Germany, which can develop and build the new generation of tanks without France ." The European "resurgence," it seems, is off to a very bad start. Ultimately, it is the relative superiority of the German economy, despite its current crisis, that is the decisive factor. A segment of the German bourgeoisie believes it can manage "without France" —for its tanks, its planes, and everything else. Conversely, the French bourgeoisie absolutely needs Germany, particularly when it comes to incurring massive new debts on a European scale. This contradiction is not new, but it will intensify sharply in the face of American and Chinese pressure. Nothing good can come of this from the perspective of the French bourgeoisie. To try to defend its competitiveness and profits, it will have no other choice but to attack the living and working conditions of the masses—young people, employees, the unemployed, and retirees—even more brutally. In other words, the crisis of French imperialism, exacerbated by the EU crisis, is paving the way for an intensification of class struggle and political polarization. The French economy and the debt crisis Many bourgeois economists predict a further deterioration in the global economic situation. This could occur as early as 2026 and would hit French capitalism particularly hard. But even before a new international crisis erupts, the French economy is experiencing a series of underperformances and setbacks. According to figures from the Bank of France, the number of business bankruptcies (excluding micro-enterprises) was twice as high in 2025 as in 2017. It also exceeded the record level of 2009, at the height of the global recession, by 14.5%. This affects not only small businesses, but also those with more than 250 employees: in 2025, they experienced more bankruptcies than in 2009 (+10.5%) and significantly more than in 2017 (+142%). In industry, the number of companies that are closing – or are threatened with closure – has increased significantly since 2024. On February 12, L'Usine Nouvelle took stock of the year 2025: "Our final count shows 124 factories threatened against 86 openings, a net loss of 38. This is a very slight improvement compared to the final balance of the previous year (-40) . " On December 9th, Les Echos highlighted that "entire sectors of industry are under intense pressure – automotive, metallurgy, chemicals… – hit hard by Asian competition and the cost of energy, which remains high. Unprecedentedly, the agri-food sector is also faltering (…). In the first half of the year, it was the sector most affected by factory closures, with 13 net closures (Blédina, Paul Prédault…)." Unsurprisingly, unemployment is rising again: +0.6% in 2025 (category A), bringing the total to 7.9% (officially). "Underemployment" (including the unemployed) has increased by the same proportion, reaching 16.9% by the end of 2025. These are the official figures, which are known to underestimate the true extent of the problem. Among young people under 25, unemployment jumped by 2.8% in 2025, reaching 21.5%. This is the sharpest increase since 2013. It signals a general slowdown in hiring, as young people are always the first to be affected. French GDP growth was 1.6% in 2023, 1.1% in 2024, and 0.9% in 2025. Current forecasts for 2026 hover around 1%, but the slowdown of recent years could continue. In any case, even without a new global crisis, it is difficult to see how the French economy could rebound significantly in the short term, given an international environment marked, among other things, by increasing pressure from China and the United States, the impact (particularly on energy) of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the decline in French exports to Germany (-5.3% in 2024), which is France's largest trading partner. Without a robust and sustained economic recovery, public debt and deficits cannot be brought under control. Tax revenues are poor due to a lack of economic growth, and budget cuts and drastic counter-reforms cannot work miracles. On the contrary, they inflict a double burden on the vast majority of the population, who suffer the consequences of both economic stagnation and austerity. The situation is all the more explosive, both socially and politically, because CAC 40 companies impose no austerity measures whatsoever on their shareholders. On the contrary, they shower them with dividends every year, to the tune of tens of billions of euros, a good portion of which comes directly from government "aid" to businesses: more than 210 billion euros per year according to the Senate itself, which is not prone to exaggeration in this area. At the same time, we learn that more than 13,000 millionaires in France pay no income tax, notably thanks to various tax "optimization" and "over-optimization" mechanisms . French national debt has surpassed €3.5 trillion, representing nearly 117% of GDP. This is almost €1.1 trillion more than at the beginning of 2020. Furthermore, in recent years, public debt has grown twice as fast as GDP. According to INSEE data, between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the third quarter of 2025, public debt increased by €1.095 trillion; over the same period, GDP increased by only €530 billion in nominal terms. The trajectory of debt and public deficits in France is unsustainable. On the left, reformist leaders—including Mélenchon—claim it's a non-issue and that alarmist rhetoric on this topic is solely aimed at justifying austerity policies. But in reality, before being used by the right to justify cuts in social spending, the evolution of public debt is both a component and an expression of the overall dynamics of French capitalism. The spiraling public deficits are inextricably linked to chronic stagnation, massive and systematic trade deficits, sluggish productive investment, and so on. On the global government bond market, all these factors are driving up the interest rates that France must pay to its creditors, who are not philanthropists. The debt service (interest payments alone) amounted to over €66 billion in 2025; it will exceed €75 billion in 2026. By comparison, the overall budget for national education in 2025 was €64.5 billion. What the increase in interest rates that France must pay its creditors reflects is the growing uncertainty surrounding the State's ability to repay its loans on time. The vicious cycle in this area is well known: rising interest rates worsen the State's financial situation, undermine its "financial credibility" (its repayment capacity), which in turn further increases interest rates, and so on. Again, this vicious cycle does not develop in isolation: it is fueled by the overall—and in this case, declining—dynamics of the French economy and the resulting political instability. It is the general impasse of French capitalism that is undermining its public finances; in turn, the public debt crisis is crippling the economic situation. In the long term, and perhaps even in the short term, the risk is a surge in interest rates on French public debt. For the bourgeoisie, this is a major concern—and not merely a propaganda exercise, as Mélenchon claims. Therefore, the ruling class has few options. It must, on the one hand, impose draconian austerity on the mass of the population, and on the other hand, increase the competitiveness of French capitalism by significantly increasing the exploitation of the working class, that is, the amount of surplus value it generates. The bourgeoisie will demand that wage earners work more, longer, and more intensely—without increasing real wages, or even by lowering them. This is the program of the French bourgeoisie. Of course, in a sense, it has never had any other program. But in the past, the balance of power between classes and the great revolutionary traditions of French workers led the bourgeoisie to hold back, and even to make concessions, because it feared—not without reason—provoking a social explosion, a new May '68. Now, the bourgeoisie can no longer equivocate and delay: it must launch a brutal and widespread offensive. In other words, it must declare war on our class. The record of Macronism In fact, this war has already begun. From Chirac to Macron, by way of Sarkozy, there has been a gradual escalation of attacks of all kinds against the living conditions of the masses. Even the "socialist" François Hollande contributed to this, between 2012 and 2017, notably with the first labor law – an attack of unprecedented scale for decades – even at the cost of sacrificing three-quarters of the Socialist Party's electoral base and foregoing a second term. In 2017, Macron launched a new labor law, followed by a counter-reform of the SNCF (French National Railway Company) and the infernal university admissions process: all offensives that previous governments hadn't dared to launch. But starting in November 2018, barely 18 months after the presidential election, the powerful Yellow Vest movement abruptly halted Macron's "reformist" momentum. He had to wait for the movement's initial waning in the summer of 2019 to attack the civil service and unemployment insurance. Then, in March 2020, the global pandemic consigned the "points-based pension" bill to the dustbin of the National Assembly, in the wake of a powerful street protest movement. The order of the day was "whatever it takes," meaning another massive increase in public debt. After his second electoral victory in 2022, Macron revived the agenda of counter-reforms. As in 2017 and 2018, he capitalized on the failing strategy of the union leadership to push through another pension reform in the spring of 2023, despite massive opposition in the streets. Unemployment insurance was once again attacked, while public "aid" to businesses continued to increase. But lacking an absolute majority in the National Assembly, and facing the growing threat of a no-confidence vote, Macron was forced to dissolve it in June 2024. As a result, the National Assembly is even more fractured. The government is reduced to relying on Socialist Party (PS) members to pass austerity budgets. It even had to grant them a "suspension" of the 2023 pension reform. The upper class is watching this spectacle with growing impatience. From its class perspective, it has a very mixed assessment of Macron's two terms in office. It expected and hoped for much more. In the economic context described above, it objectively needs budget cuts and far more profound counter-reforms. But it faces the following problem: the counter-reforms of the last twenty years, combined with the mechanical effects of the capitalist crisis, have created the conditions for an explosion of class struggle that union leadership will be unable to control , as well as for an ever-increasing political polarization —towards the right (National Rally) and towards the left (France Unbowed). In other words, at a time when the bourgeoisie must launch unprecedented attacks against our living and working conditions, it is facing an exasperated working class, on the one hand, and, on the other, a new and highly uncertain political equation. From the bourgeois perspective, a political “solution” is increasingly becoming the obvious choice: the formation of a coalition government led by the National Rally (RN) and based on a “union of the right” in the National Assembly. Admittedly, this is far from being unanimously supported, particularly among the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and “centrist” politicians. But a “center” government with a solid parliamentary majority is no longer the most likely scenario, so the ruling class no longer has much of a choice: it must actively seek the services of Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen’s party, despite the hostility it arouses among large segments of young people and the working class. Hence the “normalization” of the RN, its ongoing “de-demonization”—and the growing calls, now, to overturn the “Republican Front” at the expense of La France Insoumise (LFI). There is no reason to be surprised or to complain about this “Republican Front” against LFI. From our class perspective, it is the so-called “Republican Front against the far right” that is scandalous, because it represents a policy of class collaboration between workers' movement organizations and bourgeois parties—a collaboration that always benefits the latter and , ultimately, the far right. Conversely , the proponents of the “Republican Front” against LFI propose uniting the entire right against the left wing of reformism (LFI): from a class perspective, there is a certain logic to this. It could even be a welcome clarification, provided that LFI leaders explain its class-based nature and do not seek to resurrect the “Republican Front” against the RN. A "fascization" of society? The possibility of a National Rally (RN) government following the 2027 elections is generating considerable anger and anxiety among large segments of the youth and working class. Our position on this issue will be a key element of our work and the development of the Communist Party of Réunion (PCR). We will need to provide concrete and convincing answers to three questions: 1) How is it that the RN is in a position to come to power?; 2) How can the left and the labor movement prevent this?; 3) What will happen if, despite everything, the RN wins? We addressed these three questions at length in our pamphlet on the rise of the National Rally and the tasks of the workers' movement. In it, we explain, among other things, why a National Rally victory in 2027 would not mark the advent of a fascist or Bonapartist regime. From a Marxist perspective, this is indisputable. But in our discussions with young people and workers, we must not begin with an abstract formulation of our views on the nature of a potential National Rally government. Indeed, this perspective is not so easy to grasp, especially in a context where most left-wing organizations denounce a "fascistization" of society and prophesy a democratic apocalypse if the National Rally comes to power. We must avoid giving the impression of minimizing the very real danger that a National Rally (RN) victory in 2027 would represent. We must take into account the legitimate hostility and concern aroused by the RN and the far right in general, particularly among the youth they are targeting. We must first emphasize the responsibility of the official leaders of the labor movement in the RN's long rise: the betrayals and capitulations of successive "left-wing" governments since 1981; the so-called "Republican Fronts against the Far Right," which have reinforced the RN's "anti-establishment" stance; the participation, to varying degrees, of the right wing of reformism in racist and Islamophobic propaganda (Faure, Ruffin, Roussel, etc.); the refusal of union leaderships to organize a serious struggle against social regression; the alliances of La France Insoumise (LFI) with the right wing of reformism (Nupes, NFP) – and so on. It is the sum of the errors, renunciations and betrayals of the reformist left, for decades, that has allowed the RN to capture a growing fraction of social anger and the aspiration to "turn the tables". From this stem the program and strategy we advocate to halt the rise of the National Rally: a fight against racism and Islamophobia through a united mobilization of all workers based on an offensive and radical class-based program ; a break between La France Insoumise (LFI) and the right wing of reformism; a rejection of all forms of a "Republican Front against the National Rally"; and an internal struggle within the CGT to radicalize its program and strategy. At the same time, we must explain that to put an end to the far right, we must put an end to capitalism itself, whose crisis fuels reactionary "populism." And to do this, we must build a revolutionary party and a revolutionary International. We must first explain our program and our strategy for fighting the far right. Only then can we explain why a victory for the National Rally would not signal the advent of a fascist or Bonapartist regime. Our position stems from a concrete analysis of the true balance of power between the classes. This is true in France as well as in the United States, for example, where the magnificent mobilization of young people and workers in Minneapolis against ICE provided a good illustration of the true balance of power between the classes. Many young people and workers fear that a National Rally (RN) government would be “far worse”—even more racist and repressive, in particular—than the successive governments of the last ten years. We must not respond to these legitimate concerns with abstract considerations about the impossibility of a Bonapartist regime in France in the short term. We must respond clearly and concretely. Yes, the French bourgeoisie objectively needs to intensify racist propaganda, attacks against “foreigners,” and the undermining of our most basic democratic rights (the right to strike, to demonstrate, to assemble, etc.). And yes, of course, the RN is perfectly willing to pursue such a policy. But not only the RN: all bourgeois parties are willing, and all are preparing for it. Therefore, the question is not whether a Bardella at the Élysée Palace will be “worse” than a Retailleau, a Philippe, or a Darmanin; The question is how the working class should respond to the racist and anti-democratic offensive of the French bourgeoisie. This, once again, brings us back to the question of who will lead the workers' movement. The discussion must focus on this, because it is the key to the problem. We must frame things positively and combatively, as we did in an article published in June 2024: “In the current context, a National Rally (RN) government would be inherently weak and fragile. From day one, it would be hated by decisive segments of young people and the working class. Because of its pro-capitalist policies, it would be doomed to lose ground not only among its working-class electorate, but also among the poorest segments of the petty bourgeoisie. It is impossible to predict the pace of this process, but given the depth of the crisis and social expectations, it could be quite rapid. A central element of the equation will be precisely the program and strategy of the major organizations of the labor movement, starting with the most powerful of them: the CGT. The clearer and more combative the CGT's battle plan, the more capable it will be of mobilizing broad segments of young people and workers, and the faster the RN's social base will erode.” What holds true for the CGT also holds true for LFI and all organizations within the labor movement. In our considerations regarding a potential RN government and the policies it may (or may not) pursue, we must emphasize the role and responsibility of the leadership of the labor movement. Incidentally, this is precisely what terrifies Sophie Binet: she fears pressure from her base and the working class in general to wage a massive and radical struggle against an RN government. Having characterized the RN as the absolute enemy of the working class, and an enemy qualitatively different from the rest of the right, Sophie Binet would find it difficult to engage, as she did with Macron, in a policy of passive "consultation" with a government led by Le Pen or Bardella. Finally, we must emphasize the responsibility of the CGT and the entire labor movement in the fight against the attacks perpetrated by fascist organizations. The number of these attacks could increase even further in the coming period. The leaders of reformist organizations (LFI, CGT) are calling for the "dissolution" of fascist groups by the bourgeois state. However, these groups are auxiliary agents of the bourgeois state, which protects them. We must insist on the idea that the organizations of the labor movement must organize their own defense—and mass mobilizations—against fascist organizations. The next election campaign The 2027 presidential election campaign will be highly polarized. The shameless exploitation of the death of a neo-fascist activist in Lyon in mid-February provided a foretaste of this. The right wing, the far right, and the right wing of reformism will do everything in their power—with the unwavering support of the mainstream media—to try to discredit Jean-Luc Mélenchon's candidacy. No lie or slander will be spared him. This political polarization reflects the general polarization within society itself, against a backdrop of ongoing crisis and social regression. What the bourgeoisie hates and fears about Mélenchon is not him personally, nor even primarily his platform (even though they have nothing but negative opinions of it): it is above all the social strata that stand behind him, support him, and threaten to mobilize, which would then draw in other segments of our class. For the reasons stated above, the French bourgeoisie wants to intensify the social war against the workers. What Mélenchon—despite his reformist moderation—embodies in the eyes of the ruling class is precisely the potential resistance of the masses to the coming offensives. This is the deepest source of the visceral hostility that LFI (La France Insoumise) arouses at the highest levels of society. This hostility is reinforced by the fact that, unlike other reformist leaders (such as Jeremy Corbyn in Great Britain), Mélenchon firmly rejects the slanderous accusations leveled against him—and, quite often, vigorously counterattacks, at least verbally. For example, he never yielded an inch to accusations of antisemitism (unlike Corbyn); he even rightly pointed out that this accusation was inseparable from a justification of the genocide of Gazans. Similarly, he ridiculed the parliamentary inquiry aimed at linking La France Insoumise (LFI) to Islamic fundamentalism. In general, LFI's firm stance on Palestine and against Islamophobia (among other things) has the effect of consolidating its social base and increasing the exasperation of its opponents. That being said, Mélenchon and the leaders of La France Insoumise (LFI) are reformists, and as such, they are making numerous right-wing errors. In particular, they bear some responsibility for the rise of the National Rally (RN), at least since June 2022: the Nupes and the NFP—that is, LFI's formal alliance with the right wing of reformism—could not possibly generate any enthusiasm among the millions of young people, the poor, workers, and retirees who despise the Socialist Party (PS), the Greens, and the French Communist Party (PCF) (and especially the PS), these three old "governing" parties that are perceived as cogs in the "system" (and do nothing to correct this image). The Nupes and the NFP could not convince many people among the RN's working-class electorate or among abstaining workers, who together represent a huge pool of votes. They will be key to the April 2027 election, to a large extent. Let's compare the results of the first round of the 2022 presidential election with those of the first round of the 2024 legislative elections. In April 2022, the parties of the future NFP (France Unbowed, Socialist Party, Greens, and Communist Party) garnered a total of 10.7 million votes; in July 2024, the NFP garnered 9 million votes. For its part, the National Rally (RN) garnered 8.1 million votes in April 2022; in July 2024, the RN-Ciotti alliance garnered 10.1 million. The bottom line: 1.7 million fewer votes for the NFP, compared to 2 million more votes for the RN. The difference is 3.7 million votes. Contrary to Mélenchon's claims, the NFP was not a great electoral success. On the contrary: it contributed to further electoral gains for the RN, which presented itself as the only "anti-establishment" party. These errors by the leaders of La France Insoumise (LFI) stem from their fundamental inability to break with the right wing of reformism, which itself is directly subservient to the core interests of the bourgeoisie. Had the LFI leaders firmly maintained a principled opposition to the cowardice and pathetic moderation of the right wing of reformism, they would be in a better position at the start of the upcoming election campaign. Similarly, they would be in a better position if, instead of a "movement" devoid of genuine internal democracy, they had formed a mass party with responsible (and therefore recallable) leaders, strong local structures, and a powerful grassroots movement. At this stage, it is impossible to predict the outcome of the 2027 presidential and legislative elections. Polls currently give the National Rally (RN) an advantage, which aligns with what we have just explained. However, a Mélenchon qualification for the second round, likely against the RN, is entirely possible. Against a backdrop of enormous social and political polarization, this would be a seismic event capable of mobilizing new social strata in favor of La France Insoumise (LFI). A second round pitting Mélenchon against Le Pen (or Bardella) would throw all the "moderate" politicians into a tragicomic predicament and act like two gigantic magnets for the two class poles of society. The direction of Mélenchon's campaign would be a decisive factor in the final result: the more he tries to "move to the center," the less chance he will have of winning. Perspectives and tactics It is pointless to speculate on what Mélenchon will do and on the results of the presidential election. From our perspective, the essential point lies elsewhere: in the fact that, despite all the maneuvers of the right wing of reformism (primaries, etc.), LFI will probably be—once again—the focal point of the left-wing opposition to the "system," to the right, and to the far right. It is true that LFI's mistakes have resurrected the right wing of reformism. But the process of political polarization is such that the electoral space between LFI and the Macron supporters (or former Macron supporters) is shrinking rapidly. It is in this space that Ruffin, Autain, Tondelier, and their associates are seeking support to marginalize Mélenchon. It is unlikely they will succeed. Faced with the threat of a National Rally victory, millions of young people and workers will want La France Insoumise (LFI) to win. They will rightly consider any "left-wing" candidacy to the right of LFI to be an act of sabotage serving the right and far right. Most will also regret the "far-left" candidacies, in a context where Mélenchon's qualification could hinge on a few hundred thousand votes (as in 2022). Therefore, our critical support for LFI will find a receptive audience among the most radicalized young people with whom we will engage in discussions on campuses and at major campaign events (rallies and demonstrations). The challenge will be to clearly explain our position and leverage it to build the PCR. We must resist the opportunistic pressures inherent in this type of work. In the heat of the campaign, our criticisms will not always be understood or well received. While engaging in fraternal debate, we must not give in to the (more or less superficial) reformist illusions of the majority of young people and workers who support Mélenchon. We are orienting ourselves toward the smallest, most radical minority, those who understand—or are beginning to understand—that the program, ideas, and strategy of La France Insoumise are far too moderate, that what is needed is a program of rupture with capitalism, and therefore, the construction of a revolutionary party to defend this program. With young people tempted to vote for the "far left" (precisely because LFI is reformist), we must begin by discussing what is most important: our revolutionary ideas and program. We must first verify that we agree on this point. Only then can we explain our tactical position regarding LFI, but without making it a matter of principle (which it is not, precisely). The opposite error to opportunism is ultra-leftism. During the election campaign, ultra-leftist pressures from outside our party will be limited to the last remaining "Trotskyist" organizations that categorically refuse to offer critical support to LFI. These pressures will therefore be marginal, although they may exist in certain university settings: NPA-R, RP, etc. As for the unorganized young people who might be tempted to vote for the "far left," their influence will be all the weaker because they themselves will often be hesitant and open to our position of critical support for LFI. Some "Trotskyist" sects will criticize us for not rallying to their electoral banner (if applicable) and their "revolutionary" ideas. They will accuse us of "reinforcing illusions" in LFI's reformism. But on the one hand, upon closer examination, the ideas of LO, the NPA-R, RP, etc., are abstract, confused, and often moderate. On the other hand, we are not reinforcing any illusions in Mélenchon's reformist ideas, since it is precisely reformism that our criticism targets. Only sectarian minds could imagine that calling for a vote for Mélenchon is, in itself, a "betrayal" of Marxism. If properly formulated, our critical support for LFI, on the contrary, contributes to raising the level of awareness of those who listen to and read us. It is the very opposite of a betrayal. And at the same time, it is the best way to engage in constructive dialogue with young people and workers who are preparing to vote for LFI. We must explain our position on La France Insoumise (LFI) clearly and concretely. Regarding the prospects for an LFI government, we must avoid overly categorical statements. It is true that the bourgeoisie will exert enormous pressure on an LFI government to abandon its program. It is also true that if LFI does not go on the offensive, if it does not attack large capitalist property, it will eventually abandon its program. All of this is accurate, and we must explain it. But we cannot anticipate the stages and pace of such a process. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility that, initially, an LFI government will resist the pressure and begin to implement some progressive measures from its program. One element of the equation will be the mobilization of the masses themselves. In June 1936, the electoral victory of the Popular Front precipitated a powerful, indefinite general strike—in other words, a revolutionary crisis. Forced onto the defensive, big business had to concede to the 40-hour week, paid vacations, and other measures that weren't even part of the Popular Front's platform. The reformist and Stalinist leaders saved French capitalism, but the bourgeoisie had to take a step back before launching another offensive and crushing the workers' movement. In his Transitional Program , Trotsky emphasized that “under the influence of a truly exceptional combination of circumstances ,” including a “revolutionary offensive of the masses ,” it was not impossible that reformist leaders in power might go “further than they themselves intend on the path of breaking with the bourgeoisie .” We would be wrong to rule this out entirely in the case of a La France Insoumise (LFI) government. Of course, such a government would not put the expropriation of the French upper bourgeoisie on the agenda. But our position has nothing to do with the abstract and passive fatalism of ultra-leftist organizations that prophesy an immediate “betrayal” by LFI. We must state things positively: 1) an LFI government will be exposed to enormous bourgeois pressures, starting with those of the international financial markets; 2) The only way to break these pressures will be the expropriation of the big bourgeoisie and an appeal to European workers to follow this example; 3) the mobilization of the masses will be a decisive element in the process; 4) the only guarantee of the final victory of our class is the building of a powerful revolutionary party, one that is both prepared and determined to overthrow the capitalist system. Our argument must lead to this conclusion. The trade union movement As in 2017 and 2022, the LFI campaign will generate even more hope given that union mobilizations have failed to halt social regression, let alone secure any new gains. When workers' struggles fail in the union arena, their attention shifts to the electoral arena—provided a political force offers the prospect of a break with austerity and counter-reforms. It is likely that Macron will not implement a drastic counter-reform in the midst of an election campaign. As for union leadership, in the absence of a major counter-reform, they will probably not want to take the initiative for a large-scale, cross-sector mobilization. They will likely be content with a few routine, short-lived "days of action." However, between now and April 2027, significant struggles could erupt at the level of companies threatened with closures or restructuring plans. Furthermore, a repeat of a movement similar to that of September 10th—outside of union structures—is entirely possible: young people and the most radicalized workers will not necessarily want to wait for the outcome of the presidential election. Finally, a budget will be needed for 2027, which could act as a catalyst for new mobilizations. These could also be triggered by the international situation (imperialist wars, revolutionary movements) or by another instance of police brutality. In short, not only will the election campaign be highly polarized, but it is not impossible that it will take place against a backdrop of great social instability. The deliberate passivity and conservatism of the national union leadership over the past several decades has paved the way for large-scale mobilizations unfolding outside of union structures—at least initially. This was the case with the September 10th movement and the Yellow Vest movement in 2018 and 2019. In the future, other movements of this kind are possible, and even inevitable. Sooner or later, the class struggle—on a national scale—will escape the control of the national union leadership. That said, the accumulation of anger and frustration among wage earners will eventually find expression within the labor movement. The 53rd CGT Congress in 2023 was a very clear example of this . But other union confederations will also be affected by internal polarization. We must reject any form of sectarianism towards workers organized in the CFDT, Force Ouvrière, etc. Let's not forget that, faced with the threat of closure in 2012, the CFDT at the Florange industrial site (ArcelorMittal) mobilized under the slogan of "nationalization without compensation or buyout." As for the CGT, the most militant confederation, its internal polarization is not a linear process. There are ebbs and flows. The 53rd Congress was a high point, but it was followed by a certain retreat of the left wing. There are several reasons for this, which we had, moreover, anticipated. Many CGT activists gave Sophie Binet the benefit of the doubt. For her part, she sought to mend the rifts of the 53rd Congress . She did not attack the left wing; on the contrary, she participated in its initiatives, spoke at its rallies, and so on. As for the leaders of the CGT's left wing, they remain confused and divided on the strategy to follow. Last November, the CGT's left wing lost one of its old strongholds at the Congress of the Bouches-du-Rhône Departmental Union. It's important to understand that the "left wing" of the CGT is not a homogeneous and well-organized faction. There are, in fact , federations (like the FNIC), departmental unions (like the one in the North), local unions, and company unions that are clearly positioned to the left of the confederation's leadership. But together, they do not constitute—or at least, not yet—a centralized structure united by a common strategy, ideas, and program. Similarly, "Unité CGT" isn't really "the left wing of the CGT," as we've sometimes simplistically described it. It's simply a publication to which various sectors of the left wing contribute. But since it's the only publication playing this role at this stage, it's likely to expand its influence in the coming years. In the meantime, "Unité CGT" accurately reflects the shortcomings of the CGT's left wing. For example, in the lead-up to September 10th, they published a very good press release that once again contrasted sharply with the moderation of the confederation's leadership. But in the wake of the mobilization, its writers simply repeated ad nauseam that "everything had to be blocked," without explaining concretely how this could be achieved. Sooner or later, the internal polarization within the CGT will reach a new level. Federations and departmental unions will shift to the left. Activist figures will emerge at the national level. Under pressure, even the confederation leadership might take a step to the left, in order to maintain control. It is impossible to anticipate the details and pace of this process, which we will have to follow closely as it unfolds. In the immediate future, it should be noted that the regime crisis is pushing Sophie Binet to constantly take political positions , in full rupture with the (hypocritical) principle of "trade union independence", a principle according to which trade union leaders should only deal with extra-parliamentary struggles - and political leaders only with electoral and parliamentary struggles. Following the fall of the Bayrou government last September, all the major union federations spoke out against dissolving the National Assembly or calling an early presidential election. In line with this political stance, they did everything they could to quell the September 10th movement, stabilize the social situation, and allow Lecornu to negotiate an austerity budget with the Socialist deputies. Sophie Binet has therefore introduced a significant amendment to the "principle" of union independence: she can take a position on all political issues, generally in support of the right wing of reformism, or even the right wing outright (in the name of the "Republican Front against the National Rally"); but on the other hand, political leaders – and in particular those of La France Insoumise (LFI) – must not interfere in the extra-parliamentary class struggle! This asymmetry is not to Mélenchon's liking, who has not hesitated to call on union organizations to prepare a "general strike" in the lead-up to September 10, 2025. All of this confirms what we have explained on numerous occasions: the deepening crisis of capitalism undermines the foundations of so-called "union independence," because it breaks down the artificial boundary between electoral ("political") struggle and extra-parliamentary ("union") struggle. The right wing of the union movement will align itself ever more openly with the most right-wing leaders of the "left-wing" parties. Conversely, the left wing of the union movement will adopt and embrace "radical" political positions. In this conflict, we will defend the general position formulated in our program : "The PCR advocates for the adoption by the union movement, and first and foremost by the CGT, of a program of rupture with capitalism and socialist transformation of society. On this basis, the unions will be able to freely and democratically determine their precise relationships with the various left-wing parties." At the same time, not only must we defend LFI's right to intervene in the labor movement, but we must also emphasize that Mélenchon's movement is content, in this area, with sporadic interventions and initiatives that lead nowhere. For example, it was positive that Mélenchon called on the unions to organize a general strike on September 10th. But in the wake of September 10th, the LFI leadership allowed the union leadership to sabotage the movement; it retreated to the parliamentary arena—that is to say, to the arena of parliamentary idiocy , since nothing good could come out of the National Assembly. In doing so, the leaders of LFI have objectively helped Sophie Binet and her associates to stifle social mobilization. We must explain this in a positive, constructive, but clear and concise way. Generally speaking, our criticism of LFI targets not only its reformist program, but also its strategy, and in particular the fact that this movement could play a very positive role in building an extra-parliamentary movement – which, precisely, it is not doing. Youth and the far left We have said it repeatedly: one of the most fundamental characteristics of the current period, and one of decisive importance from our perspective, is the political radicalization of a growing segment of young people. This radicalization takes various forms. The support LFI enjoys among young people is its most significant expression, and we have already addressed the resulting tactical considerations for our party. But a small minority of young people—including, of course, among those who support LFI—are gravitating directly toward communist ideas. This is the objective basis for our growth and successes in recent years. But it is also the objective basis for the growth of other organizations that claim to be Marxist and communist. Some ultra-leftist organizations are so entrenched in their dogmatism and formalism, not to mention their internal regimes, that it's impossible to say whether they will benefit from the radicalization of young people. Other organizations, however, will undoubtedly grow and are already growing. In recent years, we have also witnessed a resurgence of "Stalinist," or rather neo-Stalinist and neo-Maoist, organizations. They are currently benefiting from a favorable situation: faced with the monstrous aggression of American imperialism, the Chinese giant can be seen as a "progressive," even "anti-imperialist," counterweight in the minds of a number of young people. Furthermore, these organizations are aligned with various postmodern ideas, particularly "decolonial" theories, which remain fashionable among certain segments of the youth. Finally, the errors and flawed methods of "Trotskyist" sects facilitate the growth of neo-Stalinists. We must make no concessions to neo-Stalinist and neo-Maoist ideas, which are a dead end. Our critique of the PaduTeam, for example, aimed to highlight the irreconcilable opposition between genuine Marxism and Stalinism (even the "neo" kind). That said, it is one thing—absolutely necessary—to firmly criticize YouTubers with large audiences who spout tons of nonsense about "Trotskyism" and Leon Trotsky. It is quite another to know how to have a constructive discussion with young people who do not yet understand the difference between Marxism and neo-Stalinist ideas. We must absolutely avoid labeling them "Stalinists" at the first confused idea they express! We must patiently and concretely explain our ideas, what China is today, but also what Bolshevism, revolutionary internationalism, and the genuine program of the struggle against imperialism are. We must bear in mind that, very often, we are dealing with young people who are rebelling against the crimes of Western imperialism. This is the starting point for our discussions with them, as we strive to win them over to the ideas and program of Marxism. In fact, this should be our general attitude toward all young people who sympathize with any "far-left" organization, whatever it may be. As we wrote in our 2023 Perspectives : "From the point of view of the development of the class struggle in the coming years, the recompositions of the 'far left' are not of great importance. Nor are they important from the point of view of building our own organization, since they will not require any significant tactical decisions on our part. On a 'tactical' level, our comrades must above all be able to distinguish between an incorrigible sectarian and a rebellious young person who is sincere, open-minded, but rightly repelled by the moderation of the reformist left's leaders. Now, there are many young people of this type outside of leftist organizations. We must know how to discuss things with them, starting not by brandishing Lenin's Infantile Disorder , but by explaining our Marxist critique of the reformist leaders." We must begin with what we agree on. Only then can we patiently and concretely explain the question of tactics towards the major reformist organizations of the labor movement. Conclusion We devoted a significant portion of this document to the most immediate prospects, namely the presidential election campaign and the situation that will result from its outcome. We discussed two scenarios: a government led by the National Rally and a government led by La France Insoumise. In reality, a victory for a centrist candidate in 2027 is still possible. But this isn't the scenario most of the young people we'll be trying to win over during the election campaign will be thinking about. They'll be worried about the possibility of a National Rally victory (which the polls are currently predicting) and will want to avert that possibility with a victory for La France Insoumise. Our discussions about the presidential election during the campaign will therefore revolve around these two possibilities. That said, let's assume that neither LFI nor the RN wins the presidential election. In that case, the legislative elections would likely result in a National Assembly without an absolute majority. But the same could actually happen if LFI or the RN were to win the presidential election. The political crisis will take different forms and paths depending on the various electoral scenarios. Generally speaking, we must understand that social instability will develop—with its ups and downs—in any scenario. The crisis of French capitalism and the contradictions between classes are such that major struggles will erupt without warning, regardless of the precise situation at the Élysée Palace and the National Assembly. This is what the September 10th movement reminded us, a movement that emerged against the wishes of the national union leadership. The two fundamental classes of French society—the bourgeoisie and the wage-earning class—are heading toward a series of major confrontations. In the absence of a revolutionary party powerful enough to resolve this conflict in favor of the workers, the process will unfold over a considerable period. This period will be marked by offensives and partial victories for our class, but also by defeats and even periods of stagnation in the class struggle. These, however, will only be the prelude to further offensives by the workers. The challenge for our party will be to intervene in events to build the PCR, to put its roots in the youth and the workers' movement, to constantly increase its strength and influence, until it is able to challenge the reformists for the leadership of the workers' movement – and thus put the socialist revolution on the agenda. https://www.marxiste.org/la-crise-du-capitalisme-francais-et-lelection-presidentielle-de-2027? Back |
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